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Decentralized Responses
to Good Fortune and Bad Luck
Richard A. Epstein*
Most forms of egalitarian theory impose on government (and through
it other people) to redress the inequalities of fortune that result from
bad luck. This Article takes issue with the various forms of this
large claim, and argues that decentralized forms of assistance are
likely in the long run to do better by the very standards by which
egalitarians justify their own program. The alleviation of poverty
depends in the first instance on increases in wealth that can only
come through private innovation and technological advances. These
have in fact produced major improvements in overall well-being,
with disproportionate advances for the poor. But if one starts with
Dworkin’s unsustainable distinction between option and brute luck,
or Nussbaum and Sen’s capability theory, then no egalitarian theory
can deliver on the promise to level differences in wealth without
seriously compromising overall levels of social welfare. By expanding
the scope of government regulation, these proposals open the door to
selfish political forces whose political clout ensures that ill-conceived
programs, such as the Americans with Disabilities Act, frustrate the
very goals they hope to achieve. State intervention to redistribute
resources should be understood as a last resort for dealing with
problems of ill fortune.
* James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of
Chicago; Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution. My
thanks to Corina Wilder Davis, University of Chicago Law School, Class of 2008,
for her excellent research assistance. I also thank the members of the University of
Chicago Workshop in Jurisprudence for their helpful comments on an earlier draft
of this Article.
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"The harder you work, the luckier you get."
Gerald R. Ford
INTRODUCTION
The topic of luck holds a long and storied place in political theory.
One reason for its prominence in legal and philosophical discourse is
that it presents one key question — what is the proper distribution of
social resources, both tangible and intangible, in a just society? — that
separates writers in the libertarian tradition from those in the egalitarian
tradition. Libertarians tend to think that luck has a relatively small place
in organizing social institutions, while egalitarians of all stripes treat it
as one of the central issues for any adequate theory of social justice.
To be sure, small government types like myself understand full well that
the inequality of fortune is in and of itself not a good thing. Nothing in
the libertarian persuasion rejects the proposition that diminishing marginal
returns to wealth favors, ceteris paribus, greater parity of income and
advantage. Rather, the libertarian reticence on the question of luck stems
from its skepticism that any centralized or collective program of government
intervention can do much to alleviate the problem of inequality once it
has occurred, without devastating losses in both liberty and productivity,
and through them, human happiness.1 Quite simply, the powerful forces of
individual self-interest, while not universal, will blunt or co-opt most of the
governmental initiatives intended to redress these differences.
Egalitarians, in contrast, often differ among themselves on the proper
ground of state intervention to respond to inequalities generally, and
specifically to those that result from bad luck or fortune. In this volume,
David Enoch concludes that "we are not entitled to what we get from the
social as well as the natural lotteries (which are, of course, not under our
control and so a matter of luck)" and that, therefore, "differences that are
due to these lotteries should be compensated for by the state."2 This claim
1 For the most influential statement of this position, see Friedrich A. Hayek, The Uses
of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945).
2 See David Enoch, Luck Between Morality, Law, and Justice, 9 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 23, 54-55 (2008). Nor does this formulation ask the question of
which state agencies should respond to the problem. I have sought to respond to
these claims in advance in Richard A. Epstein, Luck, 6 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 17
(1988).
http://www.bepress.com/til/default/vol9/iss1/art11
2007] Decentralized Responses to Good Fortune and Bad Luck 311
vastly increases the scope of government obligation and leaves unclear which
individuals must contribute how much to this vast state project to which they
may be personally opposed.
Daniel Markovits, in his defense of luck egalitarianism, places strong
limitations on state action. Thus he thinks that a state acts improperly when
it "asserts the authority to sustain distributions that advantage some citizens
and disadvantage others in morally arbitrary ways . . . purports to obligate
both the advantaged and the disadvantaged to support such distributions
— implicitly treats the advantaged as more worthy than the disadvantaged,
even though there are no morally respectable grounds for making this
judgment."3 He then concludes that the disadvantaged in such a regime count
as politically "subordinate," and that it is appropriate for a state to take into
account differences attributable to brute luck if not from conscious choice.
I shall address the issue of brute versus option luck later on, and here stop
only to make the general observation that this nonsubordination principle is
so broad that it is hard to know in the abstract whether to agree or disagree
with it. Thus, anyone in the broad libertarian tradition thinks that it is foolish
and unwise to introduce a set of subsidies that tax one group of individuals
for the benefit for another. If that is all that Markovits means by his general
proposition, then it is perfectly consistent with the view of equal rights
of liberty and property for all, coupled with a general prohibition against
all transfer payments. But if his notion of "political solidarity" envisions,
as I fear it does, a large state in which all persons "cooperate" with each
other, then it rests on the disingenuous premise that countless people can be
coaxed or coerced into developing close affective relationships with total
strangers. Such naivete´ calls for an unnecessary expansion of government
power in areas in which it is likely to perform poorly. The rate of return
from public action is likely to be far higher when government reserves its
energies for keeping individuals apart (by an effective prohibition against
the use of force), so as allow those who so choose to come together
on voluntary terms for whatever business, social, religious or charitable
purposes they see fit. More concretely, in my view, the state does not
"authorize" (even "to sustain") any distribution of wealth when it allows
private parties to enter into whatever employment contracts they choose.
The private parties do their own authorization. Yet if Markovits treats the
state backing of these contracts as "authorizing" these "morally arbitrary"
distributions, then his brand of egalitarianism supports endless disruption
3 Daniel Markovits, Luck Egalitarianism and Political Solidarity, 9 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 271, 285 (2008).
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of labor and capital markets that eliminates the prospects for division of
labor and gains from trade — prospects which allow for the high rates of
production that characterize market economies.
Markovits’s speculation highlights one frustration for outsiders to the
egalitarian tradition, which is the difficulty of knowing the extent to which its
general strictures invite or require extensive regulation of market institutions.
This point is recognized by Elizabeth Anderson when she bemoans as bizarre
the writings of some egalitarian theorists who think it is appropriate to ask
energetic workers to subsidize shiftless people who care not to work at all,
or for ordinary citizens to subsidize the expensive tastes, hobbies or exotic
religious practices of those who cannot afford to indulge in these activities on
the strength of their own resources, or for subsidies to be available for those
who suffer from defects such as a gloomy personality.4 These odd forms
of cross subsidy do not commend themselves to most ordinary people, and
Anderson is surely right to distance responsible efforts to develop coherent
egalitarian proposals from ones that are all too easily dismissed as crank.
Nonetheless, Anderson’s egalitarian concerns are troubling as well, for
they rest on a misapprehension of the resilience of markets. Thus, in this
issue she takes the position that "individuals in advanced capitalist societies
. . . are increasingly exposed to market risks."5 But her conclusion errs
in at least two ways. First, it suffers from historical amnesia, given that the
boom or bust cycles in bygone times, of which the Great Depression is only
the most conspicuous, far exceed today’s market fluctuations. Those changes,
moreover, are properly laid at the doorstep of two major government mistakes:
high tariff walls and wild swings of inflation and deflation.6 Second, her
account, like thoseofothers,doesnot take intoaccount themarketmechanisms
4 See Elizabeth S. Anderson, What is the Point of Equality?, 109 ETHICS 287
(1999) (citing Philippe Van Parijs, Why Surfers Should Be Fed: The Liberal
Case for an Unconditional Basic Income, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 101 (1991)). For
additional analyses of these problems, see Richard Arneson, Equality and Equality of
Opportunity for Welfare, in LOUIS POJMAN & ROBERT WESTMORELAND, EQUALITY:
SELECTED READINGS 2 (1997); G.A. Cohen, On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice,
99 ETHICS 906 (1989).
5 Elizabeth Anderson, How Should Egalitarians Cope with Market Risks?, 9
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 239, 240 (2008).
6 On deflation, see J. Bradford DeLong, Slouching Towards Utopia?: The Economic
History of the Twentieth Century — XIV. The Great Crash and the Great
Slump (Feb. 1997), http://econ161.berkeley.edu/TCEH/Slouch_Crash14.html; on
the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930, see, for example, United States Department of
State, Smoot-Hawley Tariff, 1930, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/id/17606.htm
(last visited May 1, 2007).
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that do cope with just these risks, including the vast improvement in insurance,
securitization, and portfolio diversification, all of which are freely available
to individuals in all income brackets, even those with low levels of market
sophistication.
Nor is it true that certain forms of risk fall more heavily on ordinary people.
Anderson is wrong, for example, to lament the decline of defined-benefit
pension plans in favor of defined-contribution plans, where in the former the
risk of market fluctuations remains largely with the firm and in the latter with
the individual holder of the retirement account. These defined-contribution
plans need not increase market risk for pension holders, who still have the
option to include debt instruments in their diversified portfolios. Indeed,
defined-contribution plans also reduce risk for employees by allowing them
to shift jobs without losing any fraction of their accumulated savings. Before
any grand philosophical generalizations can be made about the shortcomings
of markets, closer attention should be paid to how they work to minimize
risk, just as more attention should be paid to how contemporary government
policies, dealing with such matters as money supply, greatly minimized
fluctuations in inflation and deflation in the past thirty years.
In my view, the misunderstanding of these market and institutional
arrangements on the part of some critics helps put the problem of luck
in perspective, even if it does not eliminate concerns regarding the effects
luck has on the fortune of various individuals. The sheer proliferation of
egalitarian responses to luck is, however, instructive for another reason that
is not so easily disregarded. If we treat bad luck or inequality of fortune
as a valid reason that justifies some special resource claim against other
individuals in society, then deep intramural disagreement will follow as
night follows the day. The threshold conditions for government action are
so ubiquitous that it is unlikely that any two egalitarians will see eye to eye
on who should pay, who should receive, and how much. Their only point of
agreement lies in rejecting the libertarian norm that bad luck in and of itself
generates neither entitlements nor obligations that the coercive power of the
state should enforce.
The broad libertarian position, however, need not be blind to the question
of assistance to those in need. Rather, in ways that should not be dismissed
as naively cavalier, it leaves help for the unfortunate to the decentralized
decisions of various individuals and groups who respond to these problems
as they see fit, each in his or her own distinctive fashion. Some people
will do nothing at all, but even that is not troublesome for two reasons.
First, to the extent that they engage in productive labors, they benefit their
trading partners as they increase the stock of social wealth. Second, the
effectiveness of charitable activities, unlike the prevention of violence, does
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
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not depend on universal participation. The only question is whether a society
can achieve a critical mass of support, and that task should become easier
as the overall wealth of society increases and the fraction of poor people
decreases.
Suitably qualified, I think that this outlook remains the best starting point
for analysis, such that we should deviate from it, if at all, only on a very
strong showing that this system has broken down. To make that showing,
moreover, requires us take into account not only the intended distributive
implications of these programs, on which egalitarians focus, but also their
impacts on production and innovation, which egalitarians tend to downplay
or ignore. In general, I think that egalitarians tend to fail on both counts.
First, they gravitate toward standards of social well-being that tend to
minimize the differences across people, rather than maximizing the sums
of their happiness. Second, they choose means that cannot achieve their
intended goals.
One source of their mistakes is that they pay too much attention to the
intractable questions of relative preferences, whereby improvement in the
welfare of one individual is taken somehow to reduce the welfare of other
persons with whom they compare themselves. Such relative preferences, if
left unchecked, can lead to violently antisocial behaviors. "At the extreme we
have the Russian peasant whose neighbour has a cow. When God asks how
he can help, the peasant replies, ‘Kill the cow.’"7 No one will take matters that
far, one hopes, for fear of what would happen if those destructive sentiments
were applied across the board. But why even support more limited forms of
leveling down that advance Pareto pessimality — I am entitled to make you
worse off so long as I make myself worse off as well — in the fruitless quest
for greater equality? Thus, even in less extreme cases, concentrating relative
status is a dead loser because it leads to a proliferation of supposedly negative
externalities whenever the welfare of any person has improved or declined.
Let one person get richer, and all others can lament their change in relative
status. Yet at the same time, others can still rejoice in their success. This broad
definition of externalities (both positive and negative) makes it impossible to
make any intelligent statement about the welfare consequences of any change
in relative status. The only way to make any theoretical problem tractable is to
adopt a conclusive presumption that ignores all these soft externalities, both
positive and negative, in dealing with any social problem, for improvements
in wealth and health are real and don’t cancel themselves out.8
7 RICHARD LAYARD, HAPPINESS: LESSONS FROM A NEW SCIENCE 44-45 (2006).
8 For my earlier defense of this position, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN
GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 97-99 (1992)
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Second, egalitarians stumble badly on the questions of implementation.
Their schemes require constant forms of government intervention, which
would dull incentives for production even if applied faultlessly, and would be
far more mischievous when subject to the harsh winds of partisan politics.
If we could just get rid of subsidies, for example, that distort resource
allocation — of which farm subsidies are an obvious illustration — we
can vastly improve the overall situation without adopting a different set of
subsidies that will be co-opted by yet other interest groups.9 Limiting the
scope of discretion in political affairs has enormous payoffs that no egalitarian
(or any other form of) political tinkering can hope to match.
In order to defend this position, I shall first offer some account of the
libertarian or classical liberal response to these problems, while attending to
the small (relative to egalitarians) but critical differences between these two
positions. In developing this argument, I shall to some degree revisit the
positions that I have taken in an earlier article that I wrote on the topic of
luck.10 In my view, the use of decentralized and private means to combat the
risks of ill fortune will outperform state agencies over a very broad range of
social conditions. Once I have developed the classical liberal approach to this
problem, I will look at two main efforts to construct an egalitarian response
to the problem of bad fortune. The first is Dworkin’s famous but ultimately
unsustainable distinction between brute and option luck, alluded to earlier.
The second is the capabilities approach which in its various forms has been
championed by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, among others. Last, I
will look at two types of programs that attempt to deal with major forms of
bad luck. The first of these involves the treatment of disability, and the second
involves various efforts to soften the blows of adverse events by using the tax
system as a source of wealth redistribution.
[hereinafter EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS]; Richard A. Epstein, Externalities
Everywhere? Morals and the Police Power, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61 (1997).
9 For a popular account of how farm subsidies of about $25 billion per year (and
climbing) distort the relative prices in domestic markets and wreak havoc in other
countries, see Michael Pollan, You Are What You Grow: Will This Year’s Farm Bill
Make Us Fatter and Sicker?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2007, § 6 (Magazine), at 15.
In domestic markets, fruits and vegetables are slighted at the expense of processed
foods. In world markets, poor farmers in third world countries have to compete with
subsidized American exports.
10 Epstein, supra note 2.
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I. LUCK IN A LIBERTARIAN WORLD
On most occasions, when speaking about political theory, I am careful
to call myself a classical liberal and not a libertarian.11 That distinction is
important in a number of contexts, which I shall mention briefly here, and it
helps us understand the various responses to bad luck. As is well understood,
the libertarian position generally holds that the sole obligations that people
owe to strangers are negative in form: to avoid the use (including the threat) of
force against other persons, to avoid fraud (including strategic concealment)
and to keep promises. Otherwise, all individuals are entitled to the exclusive
use of their natural talents, and to keep all the external resources that they
acquire either by first possession (the occupation of land or the capture of
animals or the taking of material things) or by voluntary transfer (direct or
through intermediates) from persons who have valid title.
The basic objectives of the system are to give a clear delineation of original
rights so that all individuals know where they stand in relation to each other.
This rights definition has to be enforced by positive law because there are
too many individuals for everyone to agree on some common solution by
actual agreements. Using this basic rights definition allows for individual
utilization of human and natural resources, and for their voluntary exchange,
including various sorts of ongoing pooling or cooperative arrangements. The
logic is that each such agreement that takes place will improve the lot of the
parties to it, and will in general create greater opportunities for those who are
outside the network of voluntary exchanges. It is understood that voluntary
transactions need not take the form of bargains, but may also include various
types of gift or charitable transfers, even if they leave the transferor worse
off in material terms than before. Within the system, the key objective
of state power is to police the overall social regime in order to minimize
the number of rights violations that take place at the crucial junctures of
individual autonomy, private property and voluntary exchange. Inequality
of fortune will surely emerge from the repeated and consistent application
of these rules, as some individuals, through skill or good luck, will achieve
higher levels of satisfaction than others.12 But inequality of fortune is in and
11 See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SKEPTICISM AND FREEDOM: A MODERN APPROACH
TO CLASSICAL LIBERALISM (2003).
12 Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 17 (1915): "it is from the nature of things impossible
to uphold freedom of contract and the right of private property without at the same
time recognizing as legitimate those inequalities of fortune that are the necessary
result of the exercise of those rights." The decision upheld under the United States
http://www.bepress.com/til/default/vol9/iss1/art11
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of itself not a matter of collective concern, except as it might be a spur for
some individuals or groups to take decentralized voluntary actions to control
it.
Any faithful conformity to this position should, owing to the huge
generation of wealth that it spawns, reduce the need for transfer payments
to individuals who are unlucky. And the ever greater stock of available
wealth should make it possible for some modest fraction of the successful
individuals to help the relatively few individuals who otherwise fall between
the cracks (remember, there is no way to transfer happiness or utility as
such). That need would be limited in practice because the instances of pure,
or brute, bad luck (being hit by the proverbial meteor) are usually the easiest
losses to insure against, precisely because the risks of adverse selection
and moral hazard, which constantly prey on voluntary insurance schemes,
are largely absent here. But beyond such categorical losses as death and
blindness, these risks bedevil insurance markets that attempt to respond to
the more common conditions associated, even imperfectly, with obesity,
drunkenness, smoking and general laziness, all of which have an adverse
effect on human health and longevity.
Private efforts to alleviate bad luck may falter when adverse events hit
huge communities at one time, as with tsunamis and hurricanes, or, worse
still, as with various kinds of widespread terrorist attacks. That real risk of
common mode failure leads to limitations on insurance coverage to prevent
the entire industry from going under. The proper design of these coverage
limitations is a matter of intense dispute, because exclusion is not the only
strategy to deal with these risks. Reinsurance through the global market is
surely a second approach, which helps take the strain off individuals who
find themselves in harm’s way. Truthfully, however, most of the voluntary
rescue efforts are usually organized after the event, based on knowledge
of local conditions that dictate what sort of resources should be mobilized
and how. But again, it is important to not forget that the weaknesses that
private organizations face in dealing with huge catastrophes also plague
governments, whose institutions can be, and have been, overwhelmed, as
was the case with Hurricane Katrina.
Yet whether or not we bracket these extreme cases, the increase in wealth
and the availability of robust insurance markets are in tandem likely to do far
better than a wide range of government transfer programs. These programs
Constitution the right of employers to fire or refuse to hire employees unless they
agreed not to join a union during the period of their employment. In my view, the
case was rightly decided, but it has been emphatically overruled.
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first reduce the overall level of wealth, only to create thereafter incentives
for people to ease up, often in unobservable ways, trusting that someone else
is available to pick up the slack. Using private donors to determine recipient
eligibility helps curtail that risk, for these parties working on the ground
will in general have information to discriminate, when appropriate, between
people who slack off and those who have been hit by genuine misfortune.
On many key elements, the classical liberal position does not differ
from the libertarian view. Classical liberals certainly respect the initial
distribution of property rights in persons and things that are the hallmark of
the libertarian position. They also favor protection against aggression and
the use of voluntary transactions wherever possible. One major difference
between the classical liberal and the libertarian is that the former is
comfortable with taxation (preferably flat taxes based on either income
or consumption) and with using the eminent domain power to acquire key
parcels of land that might otherwise blockade the formation of transportation
and communication networks. Put more generally, classical liberals believe
that it is proper to use state coercion against individuals for their own benefit,
not out of a sense of paternalism but rather to overcome the coordination
and public goods problems that arise in supplying both police protection
and needed physical infrastructure, broadly construed.
Closer to the topic at hand, classical liberals take a somewhat more
receptive attitude toward the amelioration of bad fortune by others. The hard-
line libertarian draws no distinction among various kinds of preferences.
Human actions are either allowed or forbidden. You can give or withhold
assistance to others in need just as you can choose between a Schwinn
or a Raleigh bicycle. So long as you respect the perimeter of rights that
surrounds other individuals, you can do what you please with your own.
There is no intermediate category of actions subject to moral obligation
outside the domain of positive law. That includes charitable obligations. The
classical liberal takes a more complex view of social obligations that the state
should leave to individual choice. In some cases it fully respects the naked
expression of choice, as in the selection of consumer goods. But in general,
it insists that persons with great fortune share in some way their good fortune
with others, and endorses social sanctions from disapproval to ostracism to
make good on these so-called "imperfect obligations."13 I believe that this in
fact offers a better description of social life, both normatively and positively,
13 See, e.g., Joseph Story, Natural Law (unsigned article in 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA
AMERICANA 150 (1836)), reprinted in JAMES MCCLELLAN, JOSEPH STORY AND
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 318 (1971).
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than the pure libertarian version, because it well accounts for the outpouring
of these activities to supplement, or even displace, collective action on these
critical matters.
This insistence on these imperfect obligations, moreover, should not
be dismissed as an idle cop-out whose major function is to allow stingy
people to escape paying for the health of the less fortunate members in the
community. It is a powerful tradition, even if it does not always work on a
community-wide basis that egalitarians prefer, but through churches, clubs
and friendly societies that in turn achieve these goals through some messy
(but effective) amalgam of reciprocity and generosity. The upshot is that
the classical liberal should endorse (at a normative level) and expect (at a
descriptive level) a higher level of assistance through voluntary means than
does the libertarian. The next question is how this system operates.
The method of private support networks, of which charities are only one,
deviates sharply from the various egalitarian models. In the first place, the
classical liberal never insists on any norm of universal application. Triage
is just fine. Equal respect for all persons may be a nice mantra, but it
is not part of the driving force toward benevolence. It is compassion or
sympathy for particular individuals in a condition of need, or for those
with whom there is some independent empathetic bond. Accordingly, under
the usual norm of freedom of association, ordinary people can decide
to deal with other individuals in charitable ways for good reasons, bad
reasons, or no reason at all. As a general matter, the key exception to this
general at-will principle lies with monopoly providers of certain kinds of
services, such as common carriers and various network industries (railroads,
power distribution systems, communications). In those contexts, the sole
supplier has a correlative obligation to take all comers on reasonable and
nondiscriminatory terms.14 The working out of a general theory of regulation
fornetwork industries is theworkofa lifetime,but it is largelyorthogonal to the
issues raised here. There are no real network effects in charitable operations,
which can aid as few or as many as they like, with others entitled to enter to
fill the gaps that remain.
It is that level of freedom in the object of charities, well-recognized
in private law, that makes traditional forms of private assistance work.15
14 For the early statement, see Allnut v. Inglis, (1810) 104 Eng. Rep. 206 (K.B.). For
an early discussion of the subject, see H.W. Chaplin, Limitations upon the Right
of Withdrawal from Public Employment, 16 HARV. L. REV. 555 (1903). For my
views, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES FOR A FREE SOCIETY: RECONCILING
INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY WITH THE COMMON GOOD 279-87 (1998).
15 See, e.g., McDonald v. Massachusetts, 120 Mass. 432 (Mass. 1876).
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In dealing with their own operations, many groups give explicit preferences
to religious, ethnic or geographical ties. After all, "charity begins at home"
because we take care of those "nearest and dearest to us" first. This point is
no deep, dark secret. Many charitable organizations so identify themselves
in order to attract their natural class of donors: the United Jewish Appeal,
Catholic Charities, the United Negro Fund. The exact giving pattern of
these organizations tends to vary, but they may exclude outsiders in some
circumstances or send them to the back of the queue in others. The clear
impulse behind this (dare one say) laissez-fair attitude is that the first order of
business is to maximize the willingness of people to intervene benevolently,
which will not happen if the state meddles in their affairs. Saving lives is the
key objective of the enterprise. The distribution of the benefit is very much a
second order effect.
Nor should one disparage this result as inequitable, for two market forces
will tend to soften any exclusionary or discriminatory effects in charitable
giving. First, these insider preferences could be softened (and perhaps
eliminated) by conscious decision of those who supply the assistance
in question. Religious hospitals might decide to use religion-blind triage
standard in the emergency room, even if they reserve the best hospital
beds to members of their groups. Of equal importance, other groups with
other preferences help fill the void for some underprotected groups, and
for two reasons. First, most people who engage in charitable activities will
tend to extend their help where it is needed, which covers the underserved
groups. There are no charitable drives to help the rich. Just a brief look
at the website of various religious organizations exposes their focus.16 One
powerful charitable message is that "we are all God’s children." Second, other
individuals with different religious orientations, for example, could imitate
for their own groups the strategies adopted by others, with their own insider
preferences. There will of course be holes in this market, but there will be
fewer than one might expect. And of course, it is always necessary to avoid
the Nirvana fallacy, which contends that conscious government assistance will
16 For the Jewish United Fund, see Jewish United Fund, http://www.juf.org/
get_involved/inside_home.asp (last visited May 1, 2007). Its purposes include
"social welfare, health care and Jewish education programs for disadvantaged
people in Israel," and it "supports similar programs for needy Jews in more
than 60 other countries." The religious and charitable messages are intertwined.
Catholic Charities USA has the same mix. Catholic Charities USA, Mission
Integration and Catholic Identity, http: //www.catholiccharitiesusa.org/mission/
index.cfm?cfid=2316278&cftoken=35550402 (last visited May 1, 2007).
http://www.bepress.com/til/default/vol9/iss1/art11
2007] Decentralized Responses to Good Fortune and Bad Luck 321
overcome all these petty biases and unjustifiable omissions, without creating
other problems in their place. The experience with Hurricane Katrina
revealed that many charitable organizations kept out of the disaster areas
because they did not have permits, leaving slow, ineffective, bureaucratic,
petty and jealous government agencies to conduct a scandalously inept
rescue effort that led to much unneeded suffering.
Egalitarians, however, typically invoke their clear preference for state
action and ignore the endemic public choice problems in providing for
charitable assistance of all sorts on a nondiscriminatory basis. Unfortunately,
we pay a very high price by seeking universality in combating the results of
bad fortune. The effort to make sure that no one falls outside the safety net
often leads to dismantling or weakening what safety nets are already in place.
The insistence, for example, in the United States that all emergency rooms
take all patients who are at risk or in active labor has resulted in a contraction
of available emergency services.17 The equality constraint in my view should
yield in general to an ex ante expected utility test. So long as people make
their fundamental choices behind the veil of ignorance,18 they will not give
exclusive weight to the worst states with no attention to the rest. Even if risk
averse, they will seek to maximize their welfare over all expected states of the
world and not just one: why would anyone choose to reject a distribution that
leaves all persons better off in the ex ante position than some rival distribution?
Pareto optimality is an intelligible standard; Pareto pessimality (I can make
you worse off so long as I am worse off) is not. There is nothing about the veil
of ignorance approach that requires us to fall into the Rawlsian trap of trying to
organize social institutions under a maximin strategy that focuses exclusively,
or even heavily, on the position of the worst-off individuals. People certainly
do not adopt this strategy in organizing their own lives. Often, to get good
outcomes in surgical procedures, they will increase the risk of death, thinking
that the positive outcomes provide compensation for the negative ones. The
social analogies seem clear. We should never make any judgment about social
distributions that look only at one slice of the whole — bottom or top. From
behind a veil of ignorance, a positive expected utility does more for more
people. The egalitarian might think that a world with everyone at 10 is better
than one with 99 percent of the population at 100 and one percent at 1. But
few if any people would choose the first distribution.
The social lesson is clear: we should try to foster institutions that will
17 Erik J. Olsen, No Room at the Inn: A Snapshot of an American Emergency Room,
46 STAN. L. REV. 449 (1994).
18 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 12 (1971)
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save as many people as possible, and whose work cannot typically be done
with government programs that suffer from massive types of social drag.
Triage may not be an egalitarian approach, but if it is good enough for
the military it is good enough everywhere else and for one reason: it saves
lives. It is quite impossible to ask any private charitable effort to save
everyone, or seek to save everyone equally. The older view of imperfect
social obligation allows all groups to pick their targets of benevolence,
thereby taking advantage of the fundamental heterogeneity in tastes among
potential donors. Some foundations, for example, are dedicated to global
health; others to the improvement of schools in their own neighborhoods.
Leave them unfettered, and the one group will fill in the gaps left by another.
There is no need to subject all these organizations to the directions of any
central command.
II. EGALITARIAN ACCOUNTS OF LUCK AND GOOD FORTUNE
A. Dworkin on Equality
The previous arguments should make it clear that I have little or no faith
in the ability of large government action to respond to the problems of bad
luck and unequal fortune. In addition, I think that most of the egalitarian
theories fall of their own weight in the effort to specify the conditions under
which the state can seek to provide that relief on a systematic basis. The
first of these theories, which enjoys much currency today, is associated with
Ronald Dworkin, who many years ago thought that a system of egalitarian
justice had to insulate people from some, but not all forms of bad luck or
fortune.19
The first part of his theory examines the conditions that make for equality
among persons. In dealing with this issue, Dworkin does not precisely
discuss the common law first possession rule, but he does explicitly contrast
it with its closest (but not exact) philosophical equivalent, the Lockean labor
theory of property acquisition.20 That common law system works very hard
19 Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 283 (1981).
20 Id. at 309. The key difference is that the common law (and the Roman Law as
well, see G. INST. 1.66 (F. de ZuLueta trans., 1945)) postulates that all property
is unowned in the state of nature, so that no individual has any property interest
that is compromised when someone else reduces that unowned object to possession.
For Locke, property in the initial distribution was owned by mankind in common,
which moves the world closer to the egalitarian pole, and creates greater difficulties
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to make sure that each plot of land has a determinate owner, but does nothing
whatsoever to ensure that all plots of land acquired by various individuals are
of equal value or in any way, shape or form satisfy what Dworkin ingeniously
calls the "envy principle." No person, when the dust settles on the observed
allocation, prefers the holdings of someone else to the holdings that he enjoys.
Or, in Dworkin’s own words, "No division of resources is an equal division
if, once the division is complete, any immigrant would prefer someone else’s
bundle of resources to his own bundle."21 The use of the term "immigrant"
in this quotation is not mere happenstance. It is included because Dworkin’s
analysis presupposes that "a number of shipwreck survivors are washed up on
a deserted island which has abundant resources and no native population,"22
without pausing to note the unlikelihood that these two conditions will be
joined to together. In his view, any free-for-all governed by a first possession
rule will produce an unjust distribution. What is needed instead, conceptually,
is an auction whereby each person is given a number of chits (or clamshells)
that become the currency for bidding. The plot sizes and prices are adjusted
such that the market clears (which is not all that easy to do). Each person
bids exactly his number of shells for the plot of land that he acquires. Under
this condition, everyone is exactly happy with his holdings, and initial parity
takes place. The use of this market mechanism is not meant to exclude future
trades between members of the immigrant population. Rather, like the first
possession rule to which it is implicitly compared, it sets the stage for further
bargains, which will in general be binding because of the validity of the initial
allocation.
This scenario presents us with Dworkin’s view of a zero-transaction cost
world, which is why the results come out as neatly as they do. Even within
that framework its (sensible) concern with material resources means that the
auction cannot deal with the types of resentments that some people might
hold precisely because other people have gotten what they want, no matter
what it is. ("I will not accept any arrangement in which Jones is happy with
when any individual combines his labor (which Locke thought was his alone) with
external things. "But I shall endeavour to show how men might have come to have
a property in several parts of that which God gave to mankind in common, and
that without any express compact of all the commoners." JOHN LOCKE, SECOND
TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 17 (Thomas Peardon ed., Prentice Hall 1952) (1690).
For my account of some of the problems with Locke’s formulation, see Richard A.
Epstein, On the Optimal Mix of Common and Private Property, 11 SOC. PHIL. &
POL. 17 (1994).
21 Dworkin, supra note 19, at 285.
22 Id.
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his lot." "I must live next to Jones but cannot live next to Smith.") In any
positive transaction cost world, moreover, the story may not be so mellow,
because of the practical difficulties of constructing any auction that meets
these exacting conditions, as Dworkin recognizes.23 First, the conditions that
work for the auction are never satisfied in historical contexts. There are few
islands that are wholly isolated — the fertile ones tend to get settled — and
few situations in which all potential claimants to the property arrive at just the
same time, as part of some prior community that creates a common language
and some mutual trust. There is in fact no background community, as in his
example, that mutes the individualistic character of the first possession rule,
which does happen when members of groups take possession of land in the
name of their tribe, clan or family.
Historically, therefore, the tilt toward the common law rules results
from the imperfections on running auctions in situations where latecomers
threaten the stability of a prior order: auctions are no better, and perhaps
worse, than a first possession rule in dealing with the claims of late arrivals.
In any real world hubbub, there is no guarantee that one could find a leader,
let alone one who would act as a perfect fiduciary-turned-auctioneer to all
the members of the community. Nor is there in practice any way in which
this auction could be organized in time to forestall the immediate risks of
starvation and violence.
There is a larger lesson that needs to be remembered. Markets, like
other social institutions, are hard to organize, and their success depends
on a favorable social infrastructure. The comparative advantage of the first
possession rule is that it performs better under real world conditions than
any imaginary auction. Those people who come first are able to entrench
themselves, so that the system will show some sign of stability precisely
because it takes a far greater force to dislodge it. In addition, the first
possession rule establishes a focal point that helps resolve disputes when
more than two parties have their eye on certain natural resources. He who
gets there first can exclude all the subsequent takers. All of them will know
this rule well enough so that its signaling power is effective. Latecomers may
come in, of course, but only with the consent of those who are there, who
may — individually, but not collectively — well exact an admission price
in cash, kind or future services.24 There is no guarantee that this system will
23 Id. at 291.
24 Herein lies one of the major difficulties of communitarianism, which when applied
to land use decisions amounts to a collective refusal to deal with outsiders, which
is far more devastating than rules that allow individual owners alone, but not in
combination, to decide whom to let in and whom to exclude. For some sense
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prove stable in the long term. The history of violence and sieges proves just
how fragile any form of social organization is. But it surely has a better shot at
getting started than the auction method once Dworkin’s hothouse assumptions
are relaxed. Quite simply, the universal adoption of the first possession rule
in the face of constant (after the fact, of course) criticism from philosophers
shows that durability in nature may be more important than equality.
Therefore, there are powerful reasons to allow luck to play a substantial
role in setting the original allocation of external resources. But no matter
what system is used to set the initial allocation of material resources, one
point remains certain: distribution will not remain constant over time. In the
first possession world, human capital matters at least as much, or more, than
physical capital. Individuals with larger than average holdings could lose
ground through a series of unfortunate transactions, or they could parlay
their initial holdings into greater advantage. We allow these transactions
generally because we think, rightly, that they will on average improve the lot
of everyone who participates in them. It is not as though any redistribution
takes place in a zero sum universe. Indeed, with good fortune, the lot of the
worst off in some future period could be better than the lot of any individual
under the original distribution. The same result, of course, holds in the
subsequent rounds of voluntary transactions even when goods are allocated
fairly by some ideal auction. The old insight that voluntary transactions can
lead to inequalities of fortune is a brute fact of nature that no egalitarian
theory can ignore, as the earlier footnoted quotation from Coppage v. Kansas
should remind us.25 The question is what to do about deviations from the moral
norm that are in large measure justified by the need to increase the overall size
of the pie.
Dworkin is well aware of these problems, and makes two points to explain
why equality is an initial constraint on the system rather than a permanent
state of affairs. His first point is that it would be incorrect to take a snapshot
view of future wealth, while ignoring any differential consumption rates
in the interim. To do so is to give one party higher lifetime benefits than
others. It also creates a strong incentive to immediate consumption in order
to improve one’s position relative to strangers (and Dworkin does not like,
or at least stress, incentive arguments). Hence, the only possible measure
would look at the discounted present value of consumption and wealth from
of the huge dislocations that arise when inclusionary zoning systems are used to
counterweight exclusionary ones, see ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI BEEN, LAND
USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS 760-88 (3d ed. 2005) (summarizing the
Mount Laurel saga in New Jersey).
25 See supra note 12.
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the initial distribution to the present, which raises formidable valuation
questions that any theory would do best to avoid.
His second effort to overcome these consequences requires him to make
a controversial judgment on the ownership of labor. He could move into
the Rawlsian universe in which the initial allocation of talents is deemed
a matter of luck, and thus should be subject to some government revision.
But, rightly in my view, he tends to avoid that tack, and thus follows part
way down the Lockean trail by treating labor and talents as owned by the
individual that naturally possesses them. Why else, one might ask, should
anyone place stock in the welfare of individuals if we did not think that they
had the capacities of growth and choice that befit rational and autonomous
agents? Nonetheless, the clear implication of this concession is to a greater
toleration of inequality in later periods, given the differential abilities and
talents. Note that the classical liberal theory — which is not troubled by any
constraint of equality in the initial position — rides through these differences
without regret or complications, for it does not have to explain why the
equality of natural resources matters so much when every other element of
the theory moves in the opposite direction.26
The overall analysis becomes still more difficult because there are some
subsequent distinctions that Dworkin’s theory wishes to take into account,
the most critical of which is between brute and option luck.27 Stated in its
simplest form, brute luck includes those actions that took place by virtue of the
force of nature, so that no actions of the affected individual could have altered
the probability of their occurrence. The most familiar example of brute luck
is being hit by a meteor, or perhaps being caught by a tsunami. And no doubt,
there are many situations for which this description is apt. On the other side of
the line lies option luck, which is what people experience when they make an
informed gamble which could either win or lose. Dworkin’s position speaks
of a universal duty to take steps to ameliorate the adverse consequences of
brute luck, and thus considers it appropriate to require (some) redistribution of
social wealth in favor of those individuals cast into this select group. But at the
same time, he holds that individuals who make their own beds have to sleep in
them, so that folks who take gambles and lose should bear the consequences
of their own decisions, no matter how far they have fallen. Accordingly, those
whose conditions come by misfortune or birth defects have a greater claim on
26 See Dworkin, supra note 19, at 309-12, for Dworkin’s inconclusive struggle with
this point.
27 Id. at 293.
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the resources of others than individuals who engage in risky activities that do
not pan out.
In several senses this distinction is a nonstarter. In general, there is no
way to separate anyone’s natural endowments from the choices that he or
she makes: people with greater natural — or undeserved — endowments are
likely to make better choices, both in life decisions and in financial markets.
Hence the separation that Dworkin presupposes will apply in the case of
persons with identical capabilities and opportunities, which of course could
never hold in the face of natural variation across all populations on all
relevant traits.
His arguments, like many of his critics and followers, also have an air
of unreality for yet another reason. In many cases, the party who makes a
wrong choice dies, at which point the most ardent egalitarian can do nothing
to improve his welfare. In other, more financial settings, skilled traders never
bet everything on a single role of the dice but work actively to diversify
portfolios and hedge risks, precisely because they are risk averse in at least
some degree. Yet oddly enough, unlike the dead person, it is hard to wipe
out the failed trader. Even if financial capital is down to zero, human capital
is not, and so long as the bankruptcy laws provide the "fresh start" through
discharge, these people will never be wholly down on their luck.
I do not wish, however, to stress any of these objections here. Even if
these are put to one side, there is something deeply odd, even harsh, about
these examples because they cut against the usual way in which charitable
aid is dispensed to the unfortunate. Dworkin uses a model that is peculiarly
dichotomous in three senses. First, he writes as though obligations to assist
or compensate are either legal or nonexistent. There is no hint anywhere in
his article about that middle category of imperfect obligations of beneficence
that forms a critical part of classical liberal theory.28 Second, he assumes that
all luck, apart from borderline cases, falls into one of these two categories,
when in fact many important scenarios of option luck to do not involve traders
who have made skilled market decisions, but individuals in imminent peril
of death or serious bodily injury who have acted carelessly or recklessly in
managing their own affairs. In lots of situations, the antecedent negligence of
a given party may put him in harm’s way, such as the individual who did not
heed the storm signals when out to sea, who is then swept up by the tsunami.
If the mixed cases predominate in practice, as I expect they will, then the
distinction is not administrable, whatever its conceptual attractions.
Last, the position that denies compensation for wrong voluntary choices
28 See Epstein, supra note 2.
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is harsher than any encountered in practice. Thus, assume that members of
a group all start in the same initial positions and one chooses not to insure
against a risk that others insure against. They are compensated in large
measure for their losses, but the one outlier is not. It may well be that the
fortunate owe absolutely nothing to the outlier as a matter of law, but as a
matter of social practice I think that very few charitable organizations, or
individuals, would treat even a manifest want of prudence as a reason to
exclude that unfortunate person from those eligible for assistance. Dworkin
might respond that they are free to do so, since his theory only holds
that there is no political obligation to aid these persons. It hardly places a
prohibition against that assistance. Yet this argument proves too much, for if
there is no political obligation to aid those from one form of misfortune, the
same holds as well with respect to all forms of misfortune. Help privately
if you will, but do not treat any sort of misfortune as the source of a strong
political obligation.
Stated otherwise, brute luck, option luck, and any permutation of
both, should be treated as generating only imperfect obligations.29 Ex
ante incentives for people to insure can be preserved by altering the level
of assistance provided them, so that the uninsured person does not fare as
well as someone who had the foresight or resources to take precautions. It
is a much more difficult question to decide whether in the ex post world
individuals who suffered their misfortune from brute luck or from option luck
should receive the same benefit. Again, there might be some slight preference
to the person who suffered from pure misfortune, if only because there is less
of any perceived moral hazard problem than that which arises with the party
that fails to insure. But again this difference is surely likely to be expressed as
a matter of degree, and not as distinction in kind.
The hard point about ordinary intuitions on charity is to figure out
how to blend the ex post concerns with need with the ex ante concerns
with harm prevention in deciding on levels of assistance. The common
approach is to think first of the ex post situation, which is the visible
need, after which it must be asked whether to ratchet care up or down
to take into account behaviors of the needy person in the ex ante world.
On this matter, as noted above, ordinary negligence in the provision of
one’s own care does not normally tip the balance against giving aid, if
29 For an attack on Dworkin’s view on option luck within the egalitarian framework,
see Anderson, supra note 4, at 295-97; Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Egalitarianism,
Option Luck, and Responsibility, 111 ETHICS 548 (2001). For its relentless defense,
see ERIC RAKOWSKI, EQUAL JUSTICE 75-80 (1991).
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it would otherwise be supplied. Thus it is commonly accepted that no
individual is legally obligated to rescue a stranger, even when the risks
to the rescuer are small and the potential gains to the rescued are large.30
One reason for this rule is that most people will act without legal compulsion
in cases of easy rescue. But in this "no duty" world, few would-be rescuers
would think it relevant that the victim was lost at sea because of an avoidable
navigation error, or suffered injuries during a hurricane because he remained
at home too long after receiving a warning to evacuate. The usual response
is to overlook these forms of admitted negligence and to rescue just as if the
loss in question stemmed from brute luck. A similar result applies in cases of
private necessity, where the operative line is that owners, who have no duty
to rescue, must nonetheless stand aside when people in distress take steps to
use the owner’s property to save themselves or others.31 I am aware of no
legal authority anywhere, in which negligent or reckless individuals forfeit
any rights to protect themselves from natural necessity. The risk of failure
is so great that ample sanctions (in the form of injury or death) remain on
potential victims even if the usual rules of private necessity remain in place.
From the ex ante perspective, the negligent sailor may not be able to clamber
onto the dock, so that the privileges in time of necessity will not loom large
in his earlier calculations, and will thus have little or no effect on any victim
incentives to take care.
The same result holds, for example, under the traditional tort law doctrine
of last clear chance, which allows a party guilty of contributory negligence
to recover when struck by someone who has acted with blind indifference
to an evident risk. In the ex ante world, there are few occasions in which
the negligent plaintiff is harmed through the willful neglect of others. Most
cases of injury involve more prosaic harms, so that strong incentives to
take care are preserved even if in some circumstances recovery is allowed.
Likewise, within the framework of workers’ compensation statutes, injured
parties may recover routinely in the teeth of their negligent behavior. Only
willful neglect or reckless disregard of evident risks bars their recovery. Here
the argument takes on a slightly different form, namely, that the compensation
formula is set sufficiently low that even full compensation awards under the
plan leave the injured party worse off than before, so that ex ante incentives
are preserved. Indeed, there are very few cases in which (bad) option luck
30 See, e.g., Buch v. Armory Mfg., 44 A. 809 (N.H. 1897).
31 See Ploof v. Putnam, 71 A. 188 (Vt. 1908) (privileging the entry); Vincent v. Lake
Erie Transportation Co., 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910) (requiring compensation when
entry is made under conditions of necessity).
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
330 Theoretical Inquiries in Law [Vol. 9:309
denies recovery. Thus with medical emergencies, the current United States law
requires hospitals to take in all patients who are in dire stress, wholly without
regard to how they got into their condition. But prior to the adoption of the
law, most charitable institutions had to be pushed very hard (as in cases of
chronic self-destructive abuse) to exclude individuals from the receipt of care.
In all cases, the ex post state matters more than Dworkin’s account allows. The
operative assumption is to help first (if you are going to help at all) and to ask
questions about sources and origins later. The classical liberal tradition on this
point has a much better correspondence with current behaviors than the more
austere egalitarian theory which starts, ironically, from the same narrow vision
of self-interest that led Hobbes astray in such very different directions. And
for those egalitarians who think that the state should fulfill all the obligations
that the classical liberal might leave to private choice, the result is clear:
impose on the state duties of assistance in those cases where voluntary rescue
is often undertaken. The question of state provision of this form of care raises
difficult questions that we do not have to worry about here. But we should be
chary of following Dworkin’s view that lets supposed option losses lay where
they fall. And at the same token, we should not think, given the intermediate
positions that are available, that the inequality of natural resources dooms us
to an unjust society.
B. Capability Theory
1. The Basic Approach
A second major strand of modern egalitarian theory, closely associated with
Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, involves the view that all individuals
are entitled to satisfy minimum needs that permit them to exercise their
capabilities in ways that allow them to flourish.32 One practical implication
of this provision is to take our attention away from aggregate measures such
as gross domestic product that make little effort to understand or measure the
full set of nonmonetizable benefits and burdens of individuals. The capabilities
approach is also intended to give some adequate reflection of the differential
needs that people have to flourish based on their stage of development and their
particular position — pregnant or not, sick or not, disabled or not — and the
like. And in similar fashion, the capability theory takes much more seriously
32 See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, CHOICE, WELFARE AND MEASUREMENT (1982); AMARTYA
SEN, COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES (1985); Martha C. Nussbaum, Capabilities
and Human Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 273 (1997); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM,
WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH (2000).
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than, say, Dworkin, the claims that individuals have claims to increased levels
of resources based on disabilities, whether attributable to natural or social
misfortune.
At one level, the approach is surely unexceptionable. It would be a
mistake of gargantuan proportions to assume for any given individual that
financial net worth is an adequate measure of personal happiness. The
recent work by Kevin Murphy and Robert Topel, for example, repeatedly
stresses that individuals attach very high valuations to conditions of good
health, which, roughly speaking, matter as much to most people as their
financial well-being,33 and the happiness literature generally reaches the same
conclusion. The point should in some sense be obvious because of the large
amounts of money that people with deadly illnesses or constant pain spend on
medical care and other forms of relief, drawing from their own money, even
when not supplemented by public funds.
Their central observation, however, does not embarrass the classical
liberal theory. It simply gives some explanation as to the pattern of activities
and expenditures that most people (sensibly enough) make in their lives.
To be sure, it is hard to factor these features into any measure of overall
national wealth, because it is true that most individuals place enormous
value on their full web of interpersonal relationships, which cannot be
easily reduced to dollars and cents.34 Indeed, one reason why the relationship
between wealth and happiness is so often confounded in modern societies is
that people (like this author and countless other academics) quite consciously
sacrifice extensive amounts of income in order to gain a life-style and do work
that they enjoy. High income is thus often understood as compensation for
a crummy life style, so that we should expect a highly imperfect correlation
between happiness and wealth.35 The advantage of living in a wealthier society
33 Kevin Murphy & Robert Topel, Diminishing Returns? The Costs and Benefits of
Improving Health, 46 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. S108 (2003) (estimating that an
additional year of life is worth on average $350,000 to a fifty-year old man, and
$180,000 to a fifty-year old woman).
34 For an exhaustive discussion of the topic, see LAYARD, supra note 7, at 63. Layard
lists in order of importance these seven factors as determinants of happiness: family
relationships, financial situation, work, community and friends, health, followed by
personal freedom and personal values. The low ranking of health is suspect. It may
well be low for people in various states of good health who take it more or less for
granted, but as people get sicker and more crippled, it assumes an ever larger role
of life, especially for persons in constant pain.
35 For discussion, see M. Todd Henderson & James Spindler, Corporate Heroin: A
Defense of Perks, Executive Loans, and Conspicuous Consumption, 93 GEO. L.J.
1835 (2005).
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is that choosing happiness can be made with far less sacrifice of material
well-being than it could be made in societies in which lower levels of income
and material support require people to live lives of comparative drudgery.
Perhaps that is why the clergy and the physical therapists report high levels of
satisfaction, as part of helping professions, while lawyers and doctors (who
often help, for whatever it is worth) report less satisfaction.36 It seems as
though individuals (albeit in different proportions) do trade off happiness
against wealth, notwithstanding the blandishments of a consuming culture.
Who wants to be miserable eight hours a day working at something one
doesn’t enjoy? Or earn money when there is no time to spend it?
In light of these complex relationships, it is not surprising to find a weak
global correlation between individual wealth and individual happiness.37
But, by the same token, there are certain features of our public behavior that
these studies cannot explain. Thus it is rare that any group makes an effort to
give up new luxuries, even when they breed inequality. The effort is never to
ban flat-screen television. It is to get one like your neighbors, especially after
the price goes down. In addition, the tenacity of labor negotiations suggests
a real belief that more is better, notwithstanding the common "reference
group" phenomenon which leads workers to compare themselves to their
immediate coworkers, and not the rich and famous.38The claims of solidarity
demand both wage parity and wage increases, for otherwise how do we
explain the everyday dynamics of collective bargaining arrangements?
Nor do the happiness studies pick up all relevant variables when they
concentrate on reported feelings of individuals in different settings. For
example, these snapshots do not capture the lives lost at early ages because
of disease or malnutrition; indeed, they pay scant attention to the elimination
of infectious diseases and the marked increase in life-expectancy, which
stood at 47.3 years of age in 1900 and rose to around 77.0 years of age in
2000 — an increase of about 30 years in a century.39 If individual happiness
36 Tom Smith, National Opinion Research Center at University of Chicago,
Job Satisfaction in the United States, http://www-news.uchicago.edu/releases/07/
pdf/070417.jobs.pdf (last visited July 16, 2007).
37 LAYARD, supra note 7, at 3, 32.
38 Id. at 44. For a detailed discussion of these reference group issues, see TRUMAN
BEWLEY, WHY WAGES DON’T FALL DURING A RECESSION 310 (1999).
39 NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2006, tbl.27,
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus06.pdf#027 (last visited July 16, 2007). It is
worth noting that the racial disparities have dramatically decreased during this time.
The white/black difference was about 14.6 years (47.6 to 33.0) in 1900, but shrunk
to about 5.7 years (77.6 to 71.9) in 2000. That difference declined by another 0.5
years between 2000 and 2004.
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per unit of time were constant over that period, then the added years should
count for total happiness, especially since there seems to be little decline in
reported happiness with age.40
In some sense, the results of these happiness studies are encouraging
for social cohesion, for they help explain why there is relatively little
income envy across social classes. It is not as though the secretaries who
work for Wall Street investment bankers are systematically resentful of
their lot in life, relative to those who work in universities, where the wage
differentials are surely smaller. Put in another way, if income differentials
are said to matter little, as the critics of neoclassical economics contend,
then why bother with the inefficiencies of progressive taxation and direct
regulation? And if they do matter, they matter as well to the people on
top, so that it becomes hard to say that the law of diminishing marginal
utility of wealth carries over to the more nebulous area of social status.
In the end, gross domestic product is an imperfect surrogate for overall
well being, and the empirical evidence tends to corroborate this weak
correlation.41To be sure, in individual cases we can expect to see massive
gyrations between people’s financial and personal well-being, but over
large aggregations of persons the ratios will be pretty constant. It is not
likely that we shall find some mysterious inversion whereby societies
whose members have sufficiently greater resources will systematically
have unhappier people. And even if this were the case, those poorer
societies with great happiness (or, better, their individual members) could
just continue along their historic path. Either way, there is nothing about
the expanded definitions of satisfaction, or the empirical findings on
happiness, that requires ditching older understandings about political
relationships of the classical libertarian theory, just because people do not
— and they should not — operate under some narrow definition of profit
maximization.
The hard question for capabilities theory is whether it can make
good on its overall political aspiration, which is to push hard for
redistribution for those whose needs are greater than others, usually (but
not always) through no fault of their own. Strip away the rhetoric and it
has two components. First, and noncontroversially, is its libertarian side.
All vulnerable people — children, women, old people — are entitled to
protection against the use and threat of force. That of course does not
distinguish them from more fortunate individuals, except for the fact
40 See LAYARD, supra note 7, at 62.
41 See id. at 32.
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
334 Theoretical Inquiries in Law [Vol. 9:309
that a uniform public commitment to protect these interests is likely to
be of greater value to individuals who are less able to take self-help
measures to defend their persons or property. Likewise, all people,
including the vulnerable, are to have liberty of motion and travel, or as
common lawyers like to put it, to be free of imprisonment or restraint or
the threat thereof. Once again, public protection of these interests is
likely to generate greater benefits to the least self-sufficient. Next, all
people are entitled to have freedom of association, to affiliate and to
join with those whom they please, without the interference of others, in
activities that involve work, play and intimate relations. And of course,
all persons are entitled, subject to age and competence limitations, to the
usual rights to vote and to participate in public life with their fellow
citizens.
Why are these rights uncontroversial? Well, in the simplest sense there
is no coherent political theory that seeks to deny them to any individual.
So we can rely on brute consensus even if it is not reasoned. But of
course, it is a reasoned consensus when we ask which of these conditions
we would choose to relax. Not the condition of equal rights before the law,
for then we would have to decide in a society of millions of individuals
which persons are entitled to preference over millions of others, and to
measure the degree of the embedded preferences they should receive, and
to do that over and over again with each change in the life of the polity
through death, birth, immigration or emigration. The costs of running that
ambitious program are positive and large. The sum of rights that these
preferences generate is, however, only constant in that any receipt of
rights of domination or preference are necessarily offset by the duties of
subordination or disadvantage. But the value of the rights does change, in
all likelihood negatively, for there is no reason to think that these systems
of social stratification even meet the Kaldor-Hicks standard of efficiency
whereby the gains to the winner (from making, say, another person his
slave) exceed, or at least equal, the losses to those whose freedom is lost.
In making this judgment, of course, there is reason to restrict the gains and
losses to strictly pecuniary ones. The capabilities theory is clear on this
point, obviously, but so too are all varieties of the libertarian theory that
respect the subjective value that all individuals attach to their emotional,
psychological and associational states.
The same can be said about the substantive content of some of these
prescriptions. The standard libertarian theories, to be sure, often adopt a
hard natural law or deontological stance to condemn force and fraud as
wrong, because, well, they are wrong. More theorists (and certainly this
theorist) were uneasy about this foundational logic, and found powerful
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utilitarian justifications for these rules.42 But there is some real question
as to whether explicit utilitarian arguments work well as a guide to human
conduct. Social life will operate more smoothly when most people, including
philosophers, economists, and lawyers, develop strong learned, inbred, or
habitual responses in order to yield a relatively high level of conformity with
these basic commitments on a day-to-day basis, even in the absence of a
direct system of enforcement. Freud had a real point when he noted that the
process of socialization involves the internalization of these norms, such that
the people who followed them did so even in the absence of immediate threat
of legal sanction. And again, although many people will take what they can so
long as they think that they will not get caught, there are probably more whose
self-discipline would make it impossible to take what is not theirs. Remember,
common observation suggests that most people return the extra change that is
handed to them by the harried supermarket check-out clerk.43
There is, then, no reason to think that there is a deep gulf between the level
of aspirations for social welfare of the libertarian (or at least the classical
liberal, who is more explicit about recognizing the utilitarian foundations
of the basic rules of the game) and the capabilities based egalitarian. So
wherein lie the differences?
One of them has to do with the question of whether individuals should be
regarded as free, equal and independent in a state of nature, to use Locke’s
felicitous expression. Capability theorists see intense needs to give care
to infants owing to their natural state of helplessness. But they are surely
not alone. No libertarian, and certainly not John Locke, takes the position
that all individuals should be required to fend for themselves from birth.44
Parents are the natural guardians, and by inclination and legal obligation they
spend lots of their time and precious resources in caring for the young, often
without sensing any conflict of interest between their own welfare and that
of their children, although such conflicts do exist.45 But what happens when
the parents die, or cede responsibility for their children? One commonly used
alternative is for other family members to take over, so that disaster is avoided,
42 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Utilitarian Foundations of Natural Law, 12 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 713 (1989).
43 See Tom Smith, National Opinion Research Center at University of Chicago,
Altruism in Contemporary America: A Report from the National Altruism Study,
http://www.news.uchicago.edu/releases/03/altruism.pdf (last visited July 16, 2007)
(finding that Americans, on average, perform more than 100 selfless acts per year).
44 See LOCKE, supra note 20, at 30-45 (dealing with these obligations falling on
mothers and fathers alike).
45 See Robert L. Trivers, Parent-Offspring Conflict, 14 AM. ZOOLOGIST 249 (1974).
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even if the children are often not cared for as well as they would have been if
their own parents had been up to the job. In addition, the church (or the state)
surely can intervene to provide orphanages or foster care when the family
has been unable to provide assistance, although sometimes the level of care
is likely to be less than one might hope, as is surely the case in the present
hodge-podge that passes for a foster care system in the United States.
2. Positive Rights or Public Health
So the real difference between capability theory and classical liberal theory
lies in the willingness to create positive rights, in part to counteract ill
fortune and bad luck. Thus, Nussbaum’s list of capabilities stresses, for
example, that the right to live covers not only the duty to refrain from
interference, but also the positive right of "being able to live to the end of
a human life of normal length; not dying prematurely, or before one’s life
is so reduced to be not worth living." But where is it within the power of
human societies to ward off accident and diseases with fatal consequences?
What form of social policy stops automobile fatalities or murder? What
policies, or expenditure of resources, could have kept Christopher Reeve
from dying a horrific quadriplegic death after his tragic riding accident?
Similar tragedies will occur no matter what social policy is in place. All that
can be asked is to improve the odds; once death occurs, there is nothing that
can be done to right the imbalance in the individual case.
So the real social goal is to improve the odds, not to avert all cases
of individual misfortune. At this point, it is worth stressing that the great
social advance of the twentieth century in developed nations has been the
extension of life expectancy and the period of good health for all individuals,
regardless of sex, race or social class.46 But none of that gain has to do with the
aspirations of egalitarian politics. The gain comes from public health measures
which, when funded by property owners, necessarily provide benefits to the
least fortunate segments of population. It comes from advances in technology
that reduce the amount of hard bodily labor needed to survive, and that move
people systematically out of dangerous occupations like mining and farming,
while making those tasks safer for the smaller fraction of the population that
continues to practice them. It comes from discovering simple and cheap ways
to provide the right vitamins to deal with debilitating and deadly diseases such
as Pellagra, Beriberi and Scurvy. It comes from the antibiotic revolution of
46 For one such discussion, see Robert W. Fogel, Nutrition and the Decline in Mortality
Since 1700: Some Preliminary Findings, in LONG-TERM FACTORS IN AMERICAN
ECONOMIC GROWTH 439 (Stanley L. Engerman & Robert E. Gallman eds., 1986).
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the 1930s and 1940s that led to effective control of the full range of infectious
diseases that used to snuff out the lives of the young and the weak. It comes
from the ability to control diabetes, and on and on.
Nor is there any evidence that poor people as a group have benefited
less because of these improvements than rich people. Indeed, even though
differences in wealth still matter today as they always will, there is no
doubt that the gaps between rich and poor are far narrower on the personal,
emotional and psychological dimensions stressed by capability theory than
they are in wealth. The simplest question is this: right now, do we think that
the gaps in general health, happiness and well-being are greater than the
gaps in income between rich and poor? I have little doubt that this gradient
is far less steep than any differential for wealth. After all, the simplest of
measures indicates that the difference in life-expectancy from top to bottom
for both males and females is roughly 10 percent, which is a tiny fraction of
the roughly 1000-fold differences in wealth that applies to these parts of the
distribution.47 The overall compound measure of total satisfaction probably
lies somewhere in between. My guess is that a tenfold satisfaction differential
is probably high, but who can say for sure, given that so many of life’s benefits
are not easily monetizable.
Here is another set of numbers worth pondering. Around the year 1900,
infant mortality rates per 1,000 births varied from about 247 to 94, with
a consistent down gradient in mortality across social classes: the children
of poorer people died sooner. By the year 2000, that same social gradient
persisted across all classes, only now it ran from 8.1 to 3.7 per 1,000 births.
There are two ways to look at these numbers. One is to claim that there
is only modest improvement because the mortality ratio — the percentage
of deaths in the poorest cohort divided by the percentage of deaths in the
richest cohort — has moved only a little bit, from about 2.6 to 2.2.48 The
other is to note that children raised in the worst circumstances today have
less than ten percent the mortality risk of the most privileged children one
hundred years earlier (8.1 versus 94, per 1,000 births). The mortality gains to
the poorest have been far greater than the drop in mortality risk for the best off.
47 One estimate for 1998 puts the total wealth in the top 4 percent of the U.S population
at 21.4% and that of the bottom 40 percent of the population at 0.2%, which works
out to a per-person differential of about 1,000-fold. See The Rational Radical, Wealth
Distribution in U.S. (Sept. 4, 2001), http://www.therationalradical.com/dsep/wealth-
distribution.htm (last visited July 16, 2007).
48 For the data, see Michael Marmot, Understanding Social Inequalities in Health, 46
PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. S9 (2003). Note that the title of the article stresses the
inequalities, not the incredible rate of overall progress in that 100 year period.
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The poorest cohort dropped by about 240 infant deaths per thousand born, as
compared to a drop of only 90 deaths among the richest infants. These changes
occurred over long periods of time during which there was the inescapable ebb
and flow of egalitarian politics. The message should be clear — there is only
one consistent driver of health and welfare for all. It is increased prosperity
and technological advance. The rest is detail. Too much emphasis on ex post
egalitarian politics and positive rights is likely to slow down both wealth
creation and technological advance — hardly a good bargain even — make
that especially — for the worst-off in society.
III. SELF-RELIANCE, DISABILITY AND
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
I also take strong exception to yet another feature of the egalitarian story
— its unwillingness to assign either credit or blame to how people with
disabilities respond to their conditions. Over the years, I have met many
courageous disabled people who have never asked for a single favor or
benefit from any group, let alone the state, on account of their conditions.
Rather, they fought like the dickens to stay out of wheelchairs and to be
as self-sufficient as possible. Hats off to them. Yet at the same time, some
measure of blame for poor health and wealth outcomes should fall on
the individuals, and their parents, who have failed to make any (let alone
similar) efforts at self-improvement and self-preservation. Most modern
public health issues have nothing to do with communicable diseases. The
current killers are drug abuse, obesity, diabetes, heart disease, high blood
pressure, tobacco and alcohol, all of which are best controlled by individual
decisions that don’t depend on state intervention to control or cure. Yet I am
hard pressed to think of a single reference in the egalitarian literature that
points to these issues (let alone to children born out of wedlock) as pressure
points for social improvement. Rather, the literature seems to suffer from an
undercurrent of making excuses for bad conduct, which only aggravates the
basic problem. Of course, no one should treat all these harms as though they
were self-inflicted. But we should expect some serious examination of the
tough trade-off between extra assistance after the fact and the increased risk
of poor behaviors before the fact. That trade-off does not disappear simply
because we have moved from private charity to less efficient, but more
massive forms of government intervention. And the institutional designers
who pass by that issue in silence are sure to fall prey to potential program
recipients who (like everyone else) learn to game the system. Quite simply,
anyone who is oblivious to the corrosive effect of self-interest on public
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programs and institutions is likely to do little if anything to forestall the
worst.
In making this institutional plea, it is critical to remember that the
sole choice is not between doing nothing to help individuals who have
suffered from misfortune and running the current set of programs. Rather,
we have to ask whether the various forms of voluntary assistance and
accommodation should be supplemented, and if so to what extent, by forms
of state intervention — and if so, by what forms. On these twin issues of
implementation, it is a mistake to assume that all public programs have
the same prospects of success. By and large, those which reduce the level
of public discretion (such as programs like the earned income tax credit)
tend to work relatively well.49 Nonetheless, the dangers are always present,
especially in programs that provide various sorts of in-kind benefits.
I shall mention only one facet of that effort here. The current system
relies on a strong antidiscrimination norm with respect to both facilities and
employment, thanks in part to the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA).
The key feature of this antidiscrimination effort is that it relies on off-budget
measures to secure compliance with the chosen set of social objectives.
Employers have to hire and promote workers, and with minor qualifications,
they do so regardless of the costs of accommodation. Yet the cost of hiring
someone who is disabled is so high that the percentage of disabled people
now in the labor force is lower than it was in 1990, when the ADA was
adopted.50
Facilities in all new residences and workplaces have to meet certain
exacting standards, chiefly for wheelchairs, but also for individuals with
other impairments such as blindness and deafness. The requirements are not
enforced in litigation but through the permit process, which can be exacting,
and the cost of compliance today runs typically about twenty percent of
a total construction package for new facilities (at least for various public
accommodations — the cost is less for private homes and apartments),
with still heavier costs in line if retrofitting noncompliant premises becomes
an important issue. The exact cost of these proposals is hard to calculate,
49 "The United States federal Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is a refundable
tax credit that reduces or eliminates the taxes that low-income working
people pay (such as payroll taxes) and also frequently operates as a wage
subsidy for low-income workers." Earned Income Tax Credit, in WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Earned_income_tax_credit (last visited May 1, 2007).
50 See Thomas DeLeire, The Wage and Employment Effects of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 35 J. HUM. RESOURCES 693 (2000) (noting that the ADA reduced
employment among disabled men by 7.2 percent, with no increase in wages).
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because it is only with difficulty that one can tease out expenditures that are
solely, or even largely, for statutory compliance.
In my view, this entire approach gets it wrong for reasons that have as
much to do with the structure of sound democratic government as with
the strong protection of property rights under the classical liberal model.51
The off-budget nature of the program makes it impossible to compare (under
any metric that even egalitarians might adopt) the costs and benefits of the
program. That issue is not some small economistic concern. This is one of
the key vices of modern rent control programs (which redistribute wealth
away from the poor).52 It goes to the heart of how many social resources
should be spent on what activities, and how they should be spent. A better
system, by far, is one that relies on political deliberation to determine the
extent of the level of desired support, which is then coupled with an explicit
cash appropriation, either large or small, to institutions that submit winning
bids to meet government specifications for certain programs for the disabled.
No one can be sure exactly how this system would play out because no
one has tried it. But I am confident on two points. First, once the size of
the subsidy is made explicit, it will be reduced. Second, once it is reduced,
we can be confident that no champion of access for the disabled would
spread it around in small dabs to a huge number of institutions; universal
access would be the first casualty of any explicit public accounting. Faced
with a cost constraint, the confident prediction is that those in charge of
implementing such subsidies would think long and hard about how many
institutions to make accessible to different forms of disability and what
requirements to impose. That process need not be done on a once and for all
basis, and the political branches of government could increase (or decrease)
the expenditures as new data emerges. The use of this program would cut
back on the heavy cross-subsidies and the massive waste in expenditures,
while bringing attention to an issue that is critical to every discussion about
luck, redistribution and the regime of positive rights.
Matters of technique really count. The greatest criticism of most egalitarian
politics is that they are inattentive to just about all questions of institutional
design as they relate to forces of individual and group self-interest. The
stronger protection of property rights would surely dull these appetites, by
forcing state compensation for the public loss of the rights to exclude others
51 For a more detailed account of this approach, see EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS,
supra note 8, at 482-88.
52 See, for the observation, Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1988)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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from property and thus to set the terms on which they are admitted. I do
not wish to wade into any of these constitutional swamps at the eleventh
hour. But it is important to end with this observation about the sources
of material progress and social equity. Over and over again, the standard
egalitarian position tends to treat the various schemes of regulation now in
place with respect to labor, health care, housing, land use and other areas as
background conditions that fall outside their scope of inquiry.
That is a huge mistake. Redistribution via cross-subsidy carries with
it heavy costs for contested benefits. To repeat, these costs do not count
as a trump that necessarily blocks these proposals. But there is a real
methodological issue that should not be overlooked in setting social
priorities. The first means to achieve greater access and material satisfaction
lies in the removal of barriers to entry into various businesses. The gains
from these actions are typically enormous, because we find an increase
in overall social product that is brought about by a shrinkage in the size
of government and a reduction of the taxes needed to support the state.
Only after these gains are exhausted does it make sense to address the
schemes that are directed explicitly toward redistribution on any grounds.
The greatest mistake of the entire egalitarian enterprise is that it looks at
just distributions first and production of wealth last. This order needs to be
reversed, and it needs to happen now.
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